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A DELICATE BALANCE: BILL 10-77 AND
PROTECTING ACCESS TO ABORTION CLINICS
AND ANTI-ABORTION PROTESTERS' RIGHT TO
DEMONSTRATE
.Rudolf Schreiber
1. Introduction.-This note will analyze District of Columbia Bill No. 10-77
entitled "The Interference with Medical Facilities Amendment Act of 1993" (Bill
10-77), by placing the bill in a historical context and by identifying potential
constitutional issues. This note will also compare Bill 10-77 to similar legislation
enacted in Maryland in terms of the penalties each imposes and the burden of
proof each requires. Finally, this note will evaluate what effect, if any, proposed
federal legislation entitled the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE)
will have if enacted.
2. Historical Overview.-District of Columbia Councilmember Hilda Mason
introduced Bill 10-77 on January 14, 1993 with the co-sponsorship of former
Chairman John Wilson. The Council Chairman assigns all non-emergency
legislation to one or more committees for consideration, and, in this case,
Chairman Wilson referred Bill 10-77 to the Committee on the Judiciary. The
Committee on the Judiciary, chaired by Councilmember James Nathanson,
typically reviews matters of criminal law and procedure. The Judiciary Committee
has not yet reported the bill out for consideration by the Committee of the Whole?
The sponsors of Bill 10-77 did not provide a statement of purpose, but one may
infer the bill's purpose from the reasons the Council gave for previous attempts to
regulate demonstrators at or near medical facilities. One may also infer the
purpose of the bill from the number and symbolic significance of battles between
the anti-abortion and pro-choice movements in the District of Columbia. It is
probably more useful to begin with a history of that conflict.
Individuals and small organized groups began blockading abortion clinics in the
early to middle 1980's, but the most well-known and successful of the protesters
was Randall Terry. In 1986 Terry founded Operation Rescue, a New York
1. The Committee of the Whole is comprised of all members of the Council of the District of Columbia
and is chaired by the Chairman of the Council. Although the members of the Committee of the Whole are the
same as the Council of the District of Columbia. the Committee of the Whole is considered a iubsct of the
Council and has different responsibilities. See Rules Resolution for the Council of the District of Columbia.
Council Period X.
2. Howard Kurtz, Aggressively Antiabortion: Leader Vows **No Compromise" on Blo -Lading Clinics:
Critics Angered bsy Civil Rights Analogy, WAsH PosT. March 6. 1989. at A3.
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organization that used large numbers of protesters to stage sit-ins, enter clinics and
chain themselves to equipment so as to physically prevent patients seeking
abortions and other types of reproductive health services from entering the clinics
and hospitals.3 Protesters sought not only to disrupt the ability of medical facilities
to provide services to their patients, but also to disrupt the court system by
refusing to give their real names when arrested. This tactic forced police to hold
the protesters and filled jails to overflowing.4 In 1987, Operation Rescue moved to
New Jersey and began blockading clinics there.5 Shortly thereafter, Operation
Rescue became a national organization employing the tactics described above
nationwide.' During the 1988 Democratic National Convention in Atlanta,
Operation Rescue staged massive pickets and clinic blockades. Their attempts to
enter four abortion clinics resulted in hundreds of arrests. Again, arrestees refused
to identify themselves other than as "Baby Jane Doe" or "Baby John Doe" in an
effort to pack jail cells. 7 The protesters' aim was to gain release without revealing
their names or entering guilty pleas.8
Meanwhile, pro-choice organizations sought relief from anti-abortion attacks in
the court system. The National Organization for Women (NOW), the National
Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL), Planned Parenthood and others
counterattacked by successfully obtaining injunctions against clinic blockades.
These injunctions had only limited success in preventing the blockades, however,
because of Operation Rescue's blatant disregard for the court orders. In October
1988, for example, after U.S. District Court Judge Robert J. Ward ordered
Operation Rescue to pay NOW $50,000 for continuing to block clinics after a
court-ordered injunction,1 ° Randall Terry refused to pay the fine. Instead, he
urged his followers to defy the court by staging a blockade of several New York
clinics only three days after the same judge issued a permanent injunction against
Operation Rescue."1
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Morris S. Thompson. Abortion Protesters Remain Jailed. WASH POST, August 9. 1988, at A8.
8. Id.
9. See NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 300 (D.D.C. 1989); New York State Nat'l Org. for
Women v. Terry. 732 F. Supp. 388 (S.D. La. 1990); Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle. 745 F.
Supp. 1082 (E.D. Pa. 1990): Planned Parenthood Ass'n of San Matco County v. Holy Angels Catholic
Church. 765 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
10. New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 697 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
II. New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry. 704 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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In other cases, judges, perhaps because they were sympathetic to Operation
Rescue, issued injunctions so limited in scope that they only partially affected
Operation Rescue's activities. In Virginia, although NOW sought a permanent
injunction against blockades at any clinic in the Washington, D.C. area, U.S.
District Judge T.S. Ellis III granted only a temporary injunction prohibiting
Operation Rescue from blockading nine Northern Virginia abortion clinics." After
both NOW and Operation Rescue appealed various aspects of the ruling, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit upheld Judge Ellis' temporary injunction.
Furthermore, the injunction allowed anti-abortion activists to continue peaceful
pickets at the nine clinics named in the injunction. 3
Washington, D.C. has always had a significant role in the abortion rights debate
because the Supreme Court sits there and because events that happen in
Washington frequently command national attention. Thus, abortion clinics in the
District of Columbia have been a favorite target for Operation Rescue blockades
and for violent attacks by more radical anti-abortion protesters. Despite the
District's unique role in the abortion debate, however, no local laws specifically
addressed the problem of interference with medical facilities until 1989. At that
time, the District of Columbia Council passed emergency and temporary
legislation in 1989, effective for 90 days and 225 days respectively, to prevent
picketing within 100 feet of any medical facility entrance."' The Council justified
the emergency act in an emergency declaration resolution that stated that it had
become public knowledge that disruptive activity found to be volatile and
threatening to public safety in other cities was planned for Washington during the
week of November 12, 1989.18
In 1991 abortion clinic blockades and protests reached their peak and also
signaled a reversal in the Department of Justice's stand on the abortion rights
issue. Beginning on July 15, 1991, Operation Rescue staged massive protests and
blockades of abortion clinics in Wichita, Kansas, resulting in over 1,900 arrests."
U.S. District Judge Patrick Kelly issued a preliminary injunction on July 23, 1991
prohibiting Operation Rescue from blocking clinic entrances and physically

12. National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue. 726 F. Supp. 1483 (E.D. Va. 1989).
13. National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue. 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990).
14. Interference With Medical Health Care Facilities Emergency Act of 1989. 36 D.C. Reg. 8012
(1989): Interference With Medical Health Care Facilities Temporary Act of 1989. 37 D.C. Reg. 46 (1990).
15. Interference With Medical Health Care Facilities Emergency Declaration Resolution of 1989. 36
D.C. Reg. 8041 (1989).
16. Michael Bates. US. Backs Abortion Foes in Kan. Case. PtILA INULIREiR. Aug. 7. 1991. at A3.
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harassing clinic staff and patients. 17 What distinguished this demonstration from
other Operation Rescue protests was the Justice Department's unprecedented
decision to join Operation Rescue's attorneys in seeking a stay of the preliminary
injunction and challenging the court's jurisdiction in the matter. 18 Judge Kelly and
judges in many other jurisdictions issued injunctions on the basis of
Reconstruction-era legislation intended to protect blacks from harassment from
the Ku Klux Klan."9 The law, known as the Civil Rights Act of 1871 or the Ku
Klux Klan Act (Civil Rights Act) and now codified at 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3)
(1988), makes it illegal for two or more persons to conspire for the purpose of
depriving any person or class of persons from exercising their constitutional rights.
Judge Kelly noted that a clear majority of the jurisdictions that have addressed the
issue have found that a conspiracy motivated by gender-based animus is actionable
under Section 1985(3).2 0 In the past, the Justice Department had been indifferent
to the courts' use of the Civil Rights Act, but in Bray v. Alexandria Women's
Health Clinic2 1 (Bray), the Justice Department submitted a brief opposing the
court's use of the Civil Rights Act as authority for an injunction against antiabortion protesters.2" In Wichita, the Justice Department joined with Operation
Rescue to oppose the injunction by asking the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th
Circuit to overrule Judge Kelly's injunction.2" The Justice Department stated that
its opposition to the Civil Rights Act as a basis for preventing clinic blockades was
not a defense of Operation Rescue's conduct, but instead opposition to an
inappropriate device for restricting Operation Rescue's activities. 2 4 U.S. Deputy
Solicitor General John Roberts pointed out that, in the case of Bray, Operation
Rescue had targeted a specific type of behavior (having abortions) and not a class
of people (women) even though only women can exercise the right to have an
abortion.2"
Despite Judge Kelly's earlier prediction that the Supreme Court would rule

17.
1991).
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Women's Health Care Services v. Operation Rescue-National, 773 F. Supp. 258, 260 (D. Kan.

Id. at 270.
Id. at 263.
Id. at 264.
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S.Ct. 753 (1993).
Id. at 757. 113 S.Ct.at 757.
Legal Issue at Forefront of Clinic Foes' Action Attempts to Overturn Civil Rights Law. S F
CHRON. Aug. 12, 1991, at A20.
24. Supreme Court Hears Abortion Protest Case, DET FREE PRESS, Oct. 7. 1992, at 2A.
25. Id.
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against the protesters and affirm his decision,"0 the Supreme Court, in a 6-3
decision, decided Bray in favor of Operation Rescue and held that use of the Civil
Rights Act was inappropriate when applied to protesters who prevented women
from obtaining abortions.27 The decision, written by Justice Scalia, found that the
Civil Rights Act did not apply because the protesters did not display a
discriminatory animus toward women as women, but rather protested pregnant
women's decisions to have abortions. 28 Justice Stevens, in his dissent, would have
sustained the lower court rulings because the discriminatory animus Justice Scalia
found lacking was readily apparent to him. Justice Stevens stated that "an animus
[that] defends itself as opposition to conduct that a given class engages in
exclusively or predominantly" can be readily unmasked "as the intent to
discriminate against the class itself." '
The primary impact of the Bray ruling is that it prevents federal court judges
from ordering U.S. marshals to protect women seeking abortions at blockaded
clinics. This ruling was a significant loss for pro-choice organizations because state
and local resources frequently were insufficient to prevent clinic blockades.
Shortly after the Supreme Court decision in Bray, tactics employed by some of
the more radical members of Operation Rescue and similar organizations escalated
even further to include actual physical assaults on physicians. On March 10, 1993,
Michael Frederick Griffin stepped forward from a crowd of anti-abortion
protesters and shot Dr. David Gunn three times point blank in the back as he
arrived at his Pensacola, Florida abortion clinic.3 0 The fatal attack on Dr. Gunn
was followed by another attack on a doctor in August 1993 in Wichita, Kansas.
Rachelle Shannon, a participant in numerous anti-abortion protests around the
country and the editor of an anti-abortion newsletter, shot Dr. George Tiller in the
arms as he drove away from his abortion clinic.31 Although mainstream antiabortion groups condemned the shootings, a significant number of abortion
opponents viewed the shootings as justifiable attempts to prevent what they regard

26. Justice Dept. Aids Kansas Abortion Protesters. Bosro% GLOBE. Aug 7. 1991. at National/Foreign
7.
27. Bray 113 S.Ct. at 768.
28. Id. at 759.
29. Id. at 786.
30. William Booth. Doctor Killed During Abortion Protest Alleged Gunman Calmly Surrenders to
Police Outside Florida Clinic. WASH PosT, Mar. II. 1993. at AI: Constancc A- Morcila. Clinics Under
Siege. WASH. PosT. Mar. 23, 1993, at A23.
31. Mary Jordan. Don Phillips. Abortion Foe Arrested In Shooting Wounded Doctor Returns to Clinic,
WASH PosT. Aug. 21, 1993. at Al.
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as baby killing.
In direct response to the Supreme Court ruling in Bray and to the assaults on
doctors who perform abortions, Congress and numerous state legislatures
submitted bills to prevent blockades of clinics. Although most states already had
trespass and other laws to prevent clinic blockades, the penalties that existing laws
imposed were minimal while the new federal and state legislation directed
specifically at protecting clinics imposed stiff criminal and civil penalties. By
November 1993, the state legislatures of California 3 Delaware, 3 Florida,3 '
Illinois,3 5 Massachusetts, 0 and Nebraska3" had introduced and the Governor of
Colorado 8 had signed bills designed to prevent clinic blockades and imposing
criminal and/or civil penalties for interfering with staff or patients of medical
facilities.
On November 16, 1993, the United States Senate passed a version of a clinic
protection bill known as the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE)
which provided for criminal and civil penalties against anyone who prevents
patients from obtaining reproductive health services or who prevents clinic staff
from providing reproductive health services at abortion clinics.39 The House of
Representatives passed its version of FACE on November 18, 1993.40 The
penalties under both versions of the bill would be quite harsh in comparison to Bill
10-77 and similar Maryland legislation.4 1 Specifically, the Senate bill calls for
fines up to $25,000, and both the House and Senate versions call for sentences of
up to life in prison for violence resulting in death."2
2. Precursors to Bill 10-77-Bill 10-77 does not represent the first time that
the District of Columbia Council has attempted to pass legislation intended to
prevent clinic blockades. On November 14, 1989, in an effort to counteract a
campaign by Operation Rescue to blockade abortion clinics later that month, the

32.
33.

1993 California Assembly Bill No. 600, California 1993-94 Regular Session.
1993 Delaware Senate Bill No. 68, Delaware 137th General Assembly - 1993-94 Regular Session.

34. 1993 Florida Senate Bill No. 34 1993 - Special Session B.
35. 1993 Illinois House Bill No. 2521, Illinois 88th General Assembly - 1993-94 Regular Session.
36. 1993 Massachusetts Senate Bill No. 1786, Massachusetts 178th General Court - 1993 Regular
Session.
37.
38.

1993 Nebraska Legislative Bill No. 790 93rd Legislature - First Regular Session (1993).
COLO RE% STAT. § 18-9-122 (1993) (effective April 19, 1993).

39. S. 636. 103rd Cong.. Ist Sess. (1993).
40. H.R. 796, 103rd Cong.. 1st Sess. (1993).
41. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 577B (1992). Both Bill 10-77 and § 577B call for fines of up to $1,000.
Bill 10-77 provides for up to one year in jail while § 577B provides for up to 90 days in jail.
42. S. 636. 103rd Cong. 1st Sess (1993): H R. 796, 103rd Cong., Ist Scss. (1993).
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Council passed the Interference With Medical Health Care Facilities Emergency
Declaration Resolution of 1989' and the Interference With Medical Health Care
Facilities Emergency Act of 1989 (Emergency Act). 4 Then-mayor, Marion Barry,
signed the act into law on the same day. The emergency act, which was to be in
force for 90 days,45 banned picketing conducted for the purpose of intimidating or
harassing clinic staff members and patients within 100 feet of a health care
facility.46 The Council also introduced the Interference With Medical Health Care
Facilities Temporary Act of 1989'7 on the same date, and that bill finally became
law on March 15, 1990.48
In spite of the District's efforts to prevent clinic blockades, Operation Rescue
blocked the entrances to three abortion clinics just days after the Emergency Act
became law. The protests disrupted morning rush hour traffic for hours and
resulted in 733 arrests.' However, none of the arrestees were charged under the
Emergency Act; instead, police charged them with crossing police lines and
blocking the clinics' entrances.50
Despite the fact that none of the protesters were arrested under the Emergency
Act, an Atlanta-based group called Christian Advocates Serving Evangelism
contested the Emergency Act.5 U.S. District Court Judge Oliver Gasch upheld
the ordinance in a November 21, 1989 ruling, but he also indicated the act might
not survive closer scrutiny. 2 Less than two months later, On January 8, 1990,
Judge Gasch reversed his decision and struck down the ordinance on the ground of
vagueness 65 The court explained that the 100 foot zone created by the ordinance
would have banned picketers from public sidewalks, "a traditional public forum"

43. 8 D.C. Reg. 8041 (1989). Before any emergency act can be passed the Cit) Council must pass a
resolution stating that an emergency exists and describing the nature of the emergenc) D C CoDE A.% § I229(a) (1992).
44. 36 D.C. Reg. 8012 (1989).
45. Emergency acts must pass by a two-thirds majorit) after one reading. remain in effect for no more
than 90 days and do not require the approval of Congress. See DC CODE A*% § 1-229(a) (1992)1
46. 36 D.C. Reg. 8012 (1989).
47. Temporary acts must be passed in the came manner as permanent acts. ire subject to Cungrmsional
review for 30 Congressional days and remain in effect for no more than 225 calendar da)s D C CODE A,.
§ 1-229(a) (1992)
48.
49.
50.

37 D.C. Reg 2068 (1990).
Tracy Thompson. D.C. Limits on Abortion Protests Upheld. WAsii POST. No
Id.

22. 1989. at 84.

51. Id.
52.
53.

Id.
Tracy Thompson. Law Restricting Abortion Protests t StrucL Down. Judge Callh D C Ordinance

Vague. WASH PosT, Jan. 9. 1990, at B3.
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for free speech.5r
The ordinance was substantially similar to D.C. CODE ANN. Section 22-1115
(repealed May 7, 1988), a statute that prohibited exhibition of signs or posters
critical of a foreign government within 500 feet of an embassy or other building
occupied by embassy personnel (the display clause).55 D.C. CODE ANN. Section 221115 also prohibited three or more individuals from congregating within 500 feet
of an embassy or other building occupied by embassy personnel after having been
told to disperse by police (the congregation clause).56 The Supreme Court in Boos
v. Barry7 overruled two lower court decisions that upheld the display clause
because the Supreme Court found that the statute was a facial violation of First
Amendment free speech rights that did not further a compelling state interest. 5
Moreover, the Court explained that the District of Columbia statute was not
sufficiently narrowly constructed because a similar federal statute did not prohibit
speech on the basis of its content or prohibit picketing but, instead, merely
prohibited "activity undertaken to 'intimidate, coerce, threaten, or harass.' "0
Standing alone, the Court found the congregation clause problematic because it
seemed to apply to any kind of congregation and did not appear to place any limit
on police dispersal authority.6 0 However, the Court noted that the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that the statute
only permitted dispersal of non-peaceful congregations directed at an embassy."'
As narrowed by the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court found that the
congregation clause was not overbroad or impermissibly vague. 2
54. Id.
55. DC CODE A'\, § 22-1115 (1989). This section reads in pertinent part as follows: It shall be
unlawful to display any flag, banner, placard, or device designed or adapted to intimidate, coerce, or bring into
public odium any foreign government, party, or organization, or any officer or officers thereof, or to bring into
public disrepute political, social, or economic acts, views, or purposes of any foreign government, party or
organization ... within 500 feet of any building or premises within the District of Columbia used or occupied
by any foreign government or its representative or representatives as an embassy, legation, consulate, or for
other official purposes . . or to congregate within 500 feet of any such building or premises, and refuse to
disperse after having been ordered to do so by the police authorities of the said District.
56. Id.
57. 485 U.S. 312 (1988). At the time of the Supreme Court's decision, the District or Columbia Council
had passed a repealer act of DC CODE A-s- § 22-1115 (1989), 35 D.C. Reg. 728 (1988), contingent upon
amendment of 18 U.S.C. § 112, the federal legislation designed to restrict activity near embassies, to include
the District of Columbia. However, the repealer was not yet effective at the time of the decision.
58. 485 U.S. at 329.
59. Id. at 326.
60. Id. at 330.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 331.
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3. Comparison with Annotated Code of Maryland (1957), Article 27 Section
577B-If the District of Columbia Council passes Bill 10-77, u1 it will become part
of D.C. CODE ANN. Section 22-1101 et seq. which deals with preservation of the
public peace and protection of property. Bill 10-77 is essentially similar in
construction to the Annotated Code of Maryland (1957), Article 27 section 577B
(section 577B). Both Bill 10-77 and section 577B consist of four sections dealing
with definitions, proscribed behavior, protected behavior and penalties imposed for
violations. Each also protects and prohibits the same behavior, uses the same
definitions and imposes similar penalties. Both are specifically intended to deal
with the problem of protesters who engage in conduct that goes beyond their free
speech rights to deny others their constitutionally protected right to an abortion.
There are clauses in both Bill 10-77 and Section 577B that specifically protect
constitutionally protected speech by exempting speech from the prohibited acts."
Section 577B also seeks to protect certain rights of assembly by not prohibiting
picketing in connection with labor disputes.0 5 Bill 10-77 includes a similar clause,
but it affords greater protection of the right of assembly by allowing any type of
lawful picketing or assembly rather than restricting lawful pickets to those arising
from labor disputes.16 Also, both phrase their prohibitions in general terms to
apply to all types of medical facilities.
The constitutionality of the assembly clause in the Maryland statute has not
been challenged as yet, and that clause may not survive a constitutional challenge
if a court determines that the right to picket is more narrowly drawn than is
necessary to further the state's interest in protecting the public peace by
preventing criminal trespass. For example, the purpose of the statute is to prevent
interference with access to a medical facility, and that purpose can be obtained
63. The bill reads as follows: § I Ia. For the purposes of this section, the terms: (I) "Act. acting, and
action" shall not include speech. (2) "Medical facility" means a facility, agency, or organizational entity, as
defined in § 2 of the Health-Care and Community Residence Facility, Hospice, and Home Care Licensure
Act of 1983, effective February 24, 1984 (D.C. Law 5-48: DC CODE A'' § 32-1301) (1993). licensed or
otherwise authorized to provide health care service in the District of Columbia. (3) "Person" shall not include:
(A) The chief medical officer of the medical facility or his or her designee; (B) The chief executive officer of
the medical facility or his or her designee; (C) An agent of the medical facilit); or (D) A law enforcement
officer in the performance of his or her official duty. (b) A person shall not act alone or in concert with others
with the intent to prevent another person from entering or leaving a medical facility. A person shall not detain
a person or obstruct., impede, or hinder a person's free passage. (c) Subsection (b) of this section shall not be
construed to prohibit any lawful picketing or assembly. (d) Any person %ho violates subsection (b) of this
section. upon conviction, shall be lined not more than 51,000. imprisoned for not more than I year. or both.
64. Bill 10-77 § II(a)(I). MD. Am%. CODE art. 27, § 577B(a)(2) (1992).
65. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 577B(c) (1992).
66. Bill 10-77 § II(c).
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without restricting picketing only to the kind arising from labor disputes. In
contrast, if passed and eventually subjected to a constitutional challenge, the
assembly clause of Bill 10-77 will likely survive because it permits all types of
lawful picketing and only minimally impacts the right of assembly.
Both Bill 10-77 and Section 577B define prohibited acts as specific intent
crimes. Persons violating either one must intend to detain another individual trying
to enter or leave a medical facility or obstruct, impede or hinder another
individual's passage to or from the facility. 7 The major difference between Bill 1077 and Section 577B is the penalty. Although both impose fines of no more than
$1,000 and both define the violation of the statute as a misdemeanor, Bill 10-77
would impose a jail term of up to one year,68 while Section 577B imposes a
sentence of no more than 90 days. 9 The significance of the difference in maximum
sentences is that under D.C. law 70 a person charged under Bill 10-77 would be
entitled to a jury trial while a person charged under Section 577B would not.7 1
4. Comparison to The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act-The House
and Senate versions of The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE)
differ only slightly, and political commentators predict that there will be a final
version of FACE acceptable to both houses in early 1994.72 According to a report
in Congressional Quarterly, FACE has strong support from Attorney General,
Janet Reno, and the Clinton Administration and probably will not face opposition
once Congress passes a final version.7 3 The differences between the two versions
include the following: 1) The Senate version of FACE protects places of worship
as well as abortion clinics.7 4 2) The Senate version also distinguishes between
violent and non-violent violations by applying smaller fines and shorter sentences
for non-violent violations. 75 3) The House version of FACE allows for fines of up
67. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 577B(b) (1992) and Bill 10-77 § II(b).
68. Bill 10-77 § II(d).
69. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 577B(d) (1992).
70. See DC CODE ANN. § 16-705(b)(1) (1993).
71. MD. ANN. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 4-302(e)(2) (1989). The pertinent part of the statute is as
follows: (2) (i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph, unless the penalty for the offense
with which the defendant is charged permits imprisonment for a period in excess of 90 days, a defendant is not
entitled to a jury trial in a criminal case.

72.

Helen Dewar, Kenneth J. Cooper, Dust Clears on a Fruitful Legislative Year, Despite Rocky Start,

Fractious Finish. Hill Gives Clinton Many Wins, WASH PosT, Nov. 28, 1993, at Al. A20. See also, H.R.

796. 103rd Cong.. Ist Sess. (1993) and S. 636, 103rd Cong., Ist. Sess. (1993).
73.

Alissa J. Rubin. Bills to Criminalize Intimidation at Abortion Clinics Approved, Cong, Q. Wkly.

Rep.. at 3202 (Nov. 20. 1993).
74. S. 636, § 2715(a)(3).
75. S. 636, § 2715(b)
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to $100,000 for a first offense and $250,000 for a second offense. 0 Because there
are more similarities than differences in the two bills, it is reasonable to assume
that the provisions the bills have in common will remain in the final version.
It is useful to compare Bill 10-77 with FACE. For the purposes of comparison,
this note uses the House version of FACE (H.R. 796) becauses it expresses the
common provisions more simply. A potential issue that Bill 10-77 and H.R. 796
share is whether the prohibitions each imposes still allow protesters to exercise free
speech rights. Whereas Bill 10-77 addresses this problem by stating that the words
"act, acting, and action" do not include speech," H.R. 796 addresses the problem
by excluding "expressive conduct (including peaceful picketing or other peaceful
demonstration) '7 8 protected under the First Amendment.
H.R. 796 also addresses the problem of restricting activity without unduly
infringing on the right of assembly. The term "expressive conduct" could be
construed to include both speech and assembly. Bill 10-77, on the other hand,
deals with restrictions on assembly in a separate clause that specifically prohibits
any restrictions on lawful picketing or assembly."0 Of the two bills, Bill 10-77 more
clearly expresses the intent to protect the rights to speech and assembly because it
contains separate clauses which address each right.
A significant difference between H.R. 796 and Bill 10-77 is that, while both bills
contain specific intent requirements, there are two components to specific intent in
the former and only one in the latter. Under H.R. 796, a person violates the law
by intentionally obstructing, injuring, intimidating or interfering with another
person, but only if the reason for interfering is to deny a person or class of persons
trying to obtain or providing any kind of reproductive health servicesY0 If, for
example, someone intentionally interferes with a person trying to obtain an
abortion for a reason other than the fact that the person wants an abortion, then
there is no violation of the law. Such a situation might arise, for example, if a prochoice counter-demonstrator detains a patient in order to avoid an anti-abortion
demonstration. Because H.R. 796 punishes only a person who interferes with
another person because that person is seeking or providing reproductive health
care, it affords counter-demonstrators and others with good intentions protection
from prosecution. However, that provision in the bill might also make it more

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

H.R. 796.
Bill 1077
H.R. 796.
Bill 10-77
H.R. 796

§ 248(b).
§ II(a)(1).
§ 248(d)(1).

§

11(c).

§ 248(a)(I).
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difficult to convict a person interfering with another for the purpose of denying
access to reproductive health care.
Bill 10-77, on the other hand, would prohibit obstruction of any licensed medical
facility regardless of whether it provides abortions or other reproductive health
services and would apply to any person obstructing access by another regardless of
the motive for blocking access. 8 The only classes of persons exempted from the
prohibition against obstructing access to medical facilities are medical facility staff
or police acting in their official capacity.82 The only classes of persons H.R. 796
exempts are parents and legal guardians of minor children. 83
The question, then, is whether a narrow or a broad construction of prohibited
activity is more likely to withstand constitutional scrutiny. In this case, both are
equally likely to survive because they address different aims. Although both Bill
10-77 and H.R. 796 combat the same problem, i.e., interference with access to
health care, they address the problem in different ways. The government interests
that Bill 10-77 furthers are public peace and the protection of property. These
interests are no more and no less legitimate because of the type of service a person
seeks or because of the type of facility rendering the service.
H.R. 796 would become part of the civil rights chapter of the federal criminal
code and is specifically aimed at addressing a national problem experienced only
by providers of reproductive health services. H.R. 796 is intended to afford states
the kind of protection that federal courts can provide by injunction and by
authority to call in federal marshals when state courts and local police are
insufficient to guaranty patients' access to reproductive health care. Because H.R.
796 targets a specific type of activity and protects a specific type of facility, the
prohibitions it creates must be narrowly constructed so as to avoid infringing
constitutionally protected rights.
5. Impact of FACE on Bill 10-77-If Congress passes FACE, it will have no
impact on Bill 10-77 or any other state legislation directed at protecting access to
medical facilities. H.R. 796 includes a non-preemption clause85 thdt allows for
remedies by other appropriate federal statutes and by appropriate state legislation.
The Senate version of FACE (S. 636)8 6 does not deprive states of the responsibility
for prosecuting acts that may be violations of FACE and are also violations of
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Bill 10-77 § II(b).
Bill 10-77 § II(a)(3).
H.R. 796 § 248(a)(2).
If passed, H.R. 796 will be added to Chapter 13 of title 18, United States Code.
H.R. 796 § 248(e).
S. 636, 103rd Cong.. Ist Sess. (1993).
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state law or prevent a state from exercising jurisdiction over an offense it would
have jurisdiction over in the absence of FACE. S. 636 does not provide exclusive
authority to prosecute, or exclusive penalties for violations of FACE that are also
violations of other federal laws. S. 636 does not prevent aggrieved individuals from
87
seeking other available civil remedies.
Either version of FACE would broaden the remedies available to aggrieved
persons under Bill 10-77 because successful suits filed under D.C. law alone would
not provide the aggrieved party any damages. Assuming passage of a version of
FACE that includes this provision, aggrieved persons in successful suits under
federal law, at a minimum, would be entitled to $5,000 in statutory damages in
lieu of actual damages. 88
6. Conclusion-The District of Columbia Council is concerned that medical
clinics providing reproductive health services have increasingly come under attack
in recent years and that such attacks subject women to increased medical risks.
The increased threat to the health and safety of the public requires a legislative
response that balances the right of patients to have access to medical services
against the right of protesters to exercise their rights of assembly and speech. The
District of Columbia Council chose to pursue that goal by prohibiting interference
with any person seeking any kind of health care at any type of health care facility.
Bill 10-77 will allow the prosecution of anyone who violates the right of another
to seek reproductive or any other type of health care. Bill 10-77 also successfully
addresses the problem of how to protect the rights of one class of persons without
violating the rights of others by specifically excluding constitutionally-protected
speech and association. The District of Columbia Council drafted a broad response
that will likely withstand judicial scrutiny with regard to constitutionality.
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